In this article, I want to understand the nature of aesthetic experiences of landscapes. I offer an understanding of aesthetic appreciation of landscapes based on a notion of a landscape where landscapes are perspectival observerdependent entities, where the 'creator' of the landscape necessarily happens to be the same person as the spectator, and where her scientific (and other) knowledge and beliefs matter for the appreciation to be complete. I explore the idea that appreciating a landscape in this sense has quite a lot in common with taking and appreciating a photograph. On our way, we will see how imagination plays a crucial role in the story.
§1. Introduction; on the observer-dependence of landscapes
Appreciating a landscape is a unique aesthetic experience, especially when it comes to strongly scenic landscapes in appropriate light and weather conditions. I will never forget the many hours of my observations of sunrises on the Matterhorn, for instance. This 'perfect mountain' -the most photographed mountain in the world -is best viewed 1 from Zermatt, at sunrise, when its east face is lit by the rising sun, gradually displaying and emphasizing its unique shape -almost a prototype of what a 'proper mountain' is supposed to look like. Add to this the experience of the wind, the cold 2 , the picturesque clouds, red and orange at this time of the day, and the experience becomes as strong and overpowering as any aesthetic experience can be.
In this article, I want to better understand the nature of this type of aesthetic experiences. I
offer an understanding of the appreciation of landscapes based on the idea that landscapes are perspectival entities (relative to an observer), where the 'creator' of the landscape necessarily happens to be the same person as the spectator, and where her scientific (and other) knowledge and beliefs matter for the appreciation to be complete. I explore the idea that appreciating a landscape in this sense has quite a lot in common with taking and appreciating a photograph. On our way, we will see how imagination plays a crucial role in the story.
To start, it is important to avoid a possible confusion. Indeed, in what follows, I am only going to focus on the appreciation of landscapes, especially of scenic mountainscapes, and not on the aesthetic appreciation of nature in general. This restriction of the scope of my claims matters a great deal. First, nature is a much more inclusive thing than a landscape.
Nature includes animals, ecosystems, bacteria, microscopic structures of plants, galaxies, planets, etc. -all of which can be subject to aesthetic appreciation, but which cannot be said to be part of a landscape, at least not in normal cases where, for instance, the microscopic structure of a plant or a rock cannot be seen simply because it is too small to be perceived by an ordinary subject while she is appreciating a landscape (similarly for the rings of Saturn, too far to be seen in such viewing conditions, and so on). Second, while in this article I will go along with the idea that nature exists out there in the world (that is, the idea that mountains, rivers, glaciers, etc. exist in the world independently of a subject, leaving aside, for the 3 purpose of this article 3 , eliminativism about such macroscopic objects), the first thing to note about landscapes is that they do not exist in the world as entirely observer-independent entities. Again, this is not a general claim stemming from the ontology of mountains, rivers, or glaciers. Rather, it's the idea, specific to landscapes, that the observer plays a crucial role in the coming into being of landscapes qua objects of aesthetic experiences, which are not understood here as mere collections of mountains, rivers, glaciers, and so on. Rolston (1995, p.375) says that "Aesthetic experience of landscapes is not some pre-existing characteristic of the landscape that is found, but one that emerges when persons react to landscapes." He speaks here about the experience of landscapes, and of course any experience, being an experience, is a subjective affair. But the idea here carries over to the landscapes themselves, I
think. In this article, I thus propose to explore a notion of a landscape, where landscapes are understood as perspectival entities, and where they are not the same thing as nature. I suggest keeping the term "nature" for what there is out there in the world independently of any observer (the mountains, rivers, glaciers, and collections and arrangements of those), and using the term "landscape" to refer to something else -namely, something that requires at least a point of view and a framing. We humans have a perceptual system that allows us to see with an angle of view of roughly 60°. Thus, if we are standing at a location and when we are looking at a piece of natural environment in front of us (say, the Matterhorn and its immediate surroundings), we see a delimited -framed -portion of it, which we have selected to look at (we can move our eyes or our bodies to select another framing or a different point of view 4 ).
Once we have selected the point of view and the framing, we are thus, as Rolston (p.376 and 380) puts it "the landscape architects" -as he says, " [l] andscape comes into being in the 4 human interaction with nature." A landscape is thus understood here as a perspectival (one could say, partly mind-dependent and relational) entity that comes into being when an observer -a subject with a point of view and a restricted framing -perceptually interacts with a piece of nature. Granted, this is perhaps a rather technical sense of "landscape", probably not matching the ordinary use of this word (the ordinary use often takes "landscape" to mean something close to "piece of nature"). But we need such a specialized and somewhat technical term if we want to understand a certain kind of aesthetic appreciation of landscapes, where it is such a perspectival entity that we appreciate aesthetically, and not a piece of nature. The perspective, point of view, and framing are absolutely crucial (figure 3 in §3 below is a good example of that) to this kind of aesthetic experience, and insisting on this issue in the way I do will allow me to make sense of the way this type of appreciation works Rolston (1995 ), Carlson (1981 , 2000 , and Parsons (2002) , who speak mainly about nature, and not about landscapes).
The idea is this: given enough information from science, especially, when it comes to mountains, from geology, geography, glaciology, or climatology, one gets to know what the origins of a landscape -say, the Matterhorn -are, and one can appreciate the enormous forces and the huge amount of time it took nature to produce such an object. When it comes to the awe and wonder one can feel, the doings of giants or God(s) are replaced here with the 'doings' of nature, the erosion, the movements of tectonic plates, the slow movements of the glaciers, and so on. Understanding these natural processes amounts to understanding the origins of what one is looking at, where the process of creation of a mountain can be actually as impressive as the mountain itself.
Of course, many other types of information, science-based or not, can play a significant role here. For instance, the knowledge that the Matterhorn is 4'478 meters high, which makes it one of the highest peaks of the Alps, can also contribute to the way it is appreciated. (One can 'feel small' here again.) Or perhaps, information an alpinist has about the difficulty of climbing the Matterhorn's north face can make a further contribution to the way she will look at it and appreciate it (here again, one can 'feel small' by considering how hard it is to do the climb). Thus, an important distinction to be made here is one between a 'simple' and an 'informed' appreciation of landscapes. A simple aesthetic appreciation of a landscape is an appreciation mostly of its shapes and colours; as Carroll (1993, p.245) -who speaks about nature in general and not only about landscapes -puts it, it is an appreciation "[…] of a less intellective, more visceral sort, which we might refer to as 'being moved by nature'".
Sometimes, and perhaps more often than not, this is indeed how we aesthetically appreciate a landscape. A sunrise on the Matterhorn seen from Zermatt is a good example: if the weather conditions are good, its unique shape is faintly observable against the sky in the dark, only lit by the moon, and then is made gradually more and more visible by a slowly descending orange and beautiful light, first illuminating its summit and then progressively illuminating its entire shape, while its surrounding are still in the dark 6 . One can then simply appreciate the shape and the colours, in a very simple and 'visceral' way, as illustrated by the two following 
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These two landscapes exhibit several of the properties one is often looking for in an artwork, say a painting or a musical work, such as symmetry, balance, harmony, as well as 'simply beautiful' shapes, colours, and contrasts. As in the case of an appreciation of artworks such as paintings or musical works, the observer's taste will manifest itself here to judge what is more or less beautiful. Some appreciate simple desert landscapes (and will perhaps appreciate the landscape illustrated by Figure 2 ), while others will perhaps be more strongly moved by the symmetry of the reflection in the lake of the landscape illustrated by Figure 1 .
This simple, immediate, 'visceral', emotional, and non-intellective appreciation of a landscape is a subjective affair, not only because as we have seen any landscape is a perspectival entity, but also because it is the 'first reaction' to a landscape we look at.
An informed appreciation of a landscape, on the other hand, contains a lot of objective components. Knowing that the landscape illustrated by Figure 2 is an erosion-shaped glacier, not far from the summit of the Mont-Blanc, the highest peak of the Alps, certainly adds to the appreciation we can have of it. Perhaps, knowing how rare a sight the landscape illustrated by Figure 1 is -since it has to be observed at a very precise time after sunrise in conditions where there are no clouds and no wind at all, and at the right time of the year -can also augment its overall appeal. Many other types of information, coming from science, alpinism, or other sources can come into play.
Thus, it seems that the 'simple' appreciation of landscapes is more subjective, while the 'informed' appreciation is more objective. But this does not mean that there is an opposition between the two -one being subjective and the other being objective. On the contrary, they usefully complete each other: the informed appreciation will (or at least, can) come to enrich and supplement the subjective one to make the overall aesthetic experience of the landscape stronger and more complete (this is similar to the way knowledge of the origins and context of creation of, say, a painting or a novel, can enrich our appreciation of it). Thus, scientific and other knowledge helps to expand our aesthetic appreciation of landscapes, rather than impoverishing it by 'objectifying' it 7 .
§3. On imagination, and on the importance of the point of view
The way the informed enrichment of a simple appreciation works is largely due to the role imagination plays in aesthetic appreciation, in the case of landscapes as well as in general.
The idea here is that information coming from science or from other sources activates and nourishes our imaginative capacities. This is nicely illustrated by the 'information' that mountains are, say, sleeping giants, or by information about the level of difficulty of climbing Matterhorn's north face (where one can imagine oneself in the situation of doing the climb, for instance). Information from science can encourage our imagination to, for instance, visually imagine as an accelerated movie the movements of the glaciers or the movements of tectonic plates. But even less scientific and more ordinary information from simple folk observations of nature can play this role: for instance, when one looks at the Matterhorn and its surroundings in summer, one can imagine what it could look like in winter, entirely covered in immaculate white snow, and perhaps judge it to be even more beautiful than the summer landscape, without ever actually seeing it. Our imagination is thus triggered and enriched by information, scientific and/or other, and this then allows us to have a more complete and stronger aesthetic experience of the landscape. Again, there is no tension between a subjective 'imagination approach' of the aesthetic appreciation of landscapes and a more objective 'science-based approach' -on the contrary, the latter completes and enriches the former (contra Brady (1998) , see Fudge (2001) for a discussion).
Landscapes and the information we have about them actually play the role of props that stimulate imagination to produce an aesthetic experience, in a way similar to how Walton (1990) analyses the way pictures depict by being props in games of make-believe. In Walton's view, when children play and imagine tree stumps to be bears, they are creating a fictional world of the game, where it is true that tree stumps are bears, because it was decided in an imaginary -but controlled -way, that tree stumps represent bears. In the case of aesthetic appreciation of landscapes, there is the 'simple' perception and appreciation of it, but as we have seen there is also the possibility of imagination playing an important role, based on the I have insisted on the role imagination plays (or at least can play) in the appreciation of landscapes, and on the role information plays (or at least can play) as well. I have said that an informed appreciation of, say, the Matterhorn is richer and stronger than a simple one. Now, one could agree with all this but still object that this informed appreciation is not an aesthetic one. One could think that values attributed to a landscape based on information coming from science, alpinism, etc. are intellectual values, not aesthetic ones.
As a reaction to this legitimate worry, I suggest to simply observe that the informed (and imagination-nourished) appreciation of landscapes has all the typical characteristics of an aesthetic appreciation -thus, there simply is no reason to think that it is not genuinely aesthetic. At the level of simple appreciation, as we have seen, landscapes exhibit typical features artworks can have, such as unity, simplicity, harmony, or symmetry. These features can be found at the informed level as well, albeit in a different way. For instance, the sciencebased and imagination-nourished accelerated movements of the glaciers, flowing around the Matterhorn and shaping it, can possess this type of features. Or, to take an alpinism-informed example: a particular route to climb Matterhorn's north face can also be appreciated as being particularly harmonious, with a constant level of difficulty, involving elegant climbing moves that have to be made, and the line itself, as projected in an imaginary way on the mountain when viewed from the valley, can have a symmetry, harmony, simplicity, and elegance of its own.
When it comes to the way we talk about landscapes, not only the simple appreciation but the informed appreciation as well typically give rise to statements of aesthetic judgements. A landscape is often said to be beautiful, and even more so when information of the kind mentioned above is added.
Also, and quite importantly, exactly as a simply appreciated landscape, a landscape appreciated in an informed and imagination-enriched way has the capacity to cause passion and emotion -to borrow Hume's way to put it, such a landscape is fully "fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul" (Hume (1975, p.299) exhibited in the British museum. The knowledge about the homogeneity and perfect microstructure of such a high-quality rock can thus augment the "delight" and the "pleasure and satisfaction to the soul" that both the mountain and the statue can give the spectator (or the alpinist). (Of course, the structure of this type of granite that is visible to the naked eye when viewed from a close distance can be a subject of simple aesthetic appreciation as well. But when one observes a landscape, one is usually not close enough for this to play any role in the appreciation of the landscape.)
In general, landscapes have in common with all objects of aesthetic appreciation that their aesthetic properties are grounded 10 in their non-aesthetic properties. These non-aesthetic properties of course include the sensory properties one gets from a simple appreciation of a landscape, but they can also include non-sensory properties based on additional information, knowledge/beliefs, and imagination. Granted, the sensory properties are necessary and the 12 additional properties are probably not. But this does not prevent these additional non-aesthetic properties to enrich the appreciation of a landscape in such a way that the resulting overall appreciation of it is aesthetic -thus, a landscape's aesthetic properties are necessarily partly grounded in its non-aesthetic sensory properties, and contingently partly grounded in its nonaesthetic information-and-imagination-based properties. A landscape's sensory properties are a necessary starting point, but they do not (have to) exhaust the basis for an overall aesthetic experience.
Similarly as in the case of works of art such as paintings, novels, or musical works, we have already seen above that the taste of the spectator and the origins (the creation) of a landscape (can) play a significant role in its aesthetic appreciation. Exactly as in the case of artworks, a quality evaluator is needed. For instance, one must be careful to use one's imagination in an appropriate way, for there is the risk that instead of enriching the appreciation of the landscape it can actually divert our attention from it -say, if I look at the Matterhorn, and this makes me imagine it as a Toblerone, which in turn makes me think of chocolate, which makes me think of my two years old son and the chocolate stain he made on the sofa yesterday.
Imagination (exactly as in the case of paintings in Walton's view) has to be controlled and guided in a careful and relevant way 11 . Thus, taste and the use of imagination are to be understood here as rather sophisticated capacities -as Hume would say, not everybody's taste counts 12 , and not everybody is a good critic of art … and a good appreciator of landscapes.
To sum up:
 Landscapes can possess features such as unity, simplicity, harmony, and symmetry, both under a simple and an informed appreciation.  Landscapes are often said to be beautiful, both under a simple and an informed appreciation, by competent appreciators.  Landscapes can cause appropriate emotional responses in their spectators, both under a simple and an informed appreciation.  The aesthetic properties of landscapes are well-understood as being grounded in their non-aesthetic properties -sensory, informed, and imagination-based.
11 Brady (1998, p.143-144) makes an interesting distinction here between four kinds of imagination -ampliative, revelatory, exploratory, and projective -and the various ways it can play a role in the aesthetic appreciation of nature (and not only landscapes).
12 Hume (1985, p.240-241) also adds that such qualified judges also have to be practiced in the attribution of aesthetic properties, have to have a "good sense", and have to be intellectually honest.
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 The origin (the creation) of a landscape can matter for its appreciation.
 The taste of the spectator of a landscape matters for its appreciation.
 Imagination plays a crucial role in the appreciation of landscapes.
Thus, landscapes behave in a way that is relevantly very similar to other objects of aesthetic appreciation, and the natural thing to conclude here is then simply to accept that the appreciation one has of landscapes -both simple and informed -is genuinely aesthetic.
§5. On landscapes and photographs
Given the crucial role imagination and information play in aesthetic appreciation of landscapes, I would like to offer now an understanding of such an appreciation of landscapes where appreciating a landscape has some relevant similarities with the appreciation of a photograph. There are at least four relevant points of similarity between landscapes and photographs:
(i) Landscapes, like photographs, come into existence in an observer-dependent way -no observer, no landscape; no photographer, no photograph 13 .
(ii) Landscapes, like photographs, are framed and taken or observed from a point of view, at a specific time.
(iii) Both landscapes and photographs (unlike paintings) always involve the existence of something in the world.
(iv) Landscapes, qua observer-dependent entities, are transparent, in a sense very similar to photographs. This photograph shows the mountains above Chamonix, France, at a very special time, when the rising sun casts the shadow of the mountains on the surface of the clouds. Clearly, when observed an hour later, the landscape is a completely different affair. When it comes to the aesthetic appreciation of both the landscape and the photograph, the time at which it was observed/taken is absolutely crucial -indeed, in this case, it is the main thing that makes it aesthetically interesting. Thus, aesthetic properties of landscapes, like aesthetic properties of photographs, are relative to a framing, a point of view, an observer, and the time of observation (all of these should be included in the basis in which the aesthetic properties are grounded). This is how the context of creation of landscapes and of photographs can be (Of course, some of these similarities can also, at least partly, concern other types of aesthetically appreciated objects, such as for instance paintings 15 .)
Photographs, unlike other types of depictive entities (relevantly, unlike paintings), are always photographs of something existing (at the time of the creation of the photograph).
Even a blurred, distorted, black-and-white photograph is always, in virtue of the nature of what a photograph is and how it comes into being, a photograph of something (something that reflects light recorded by the camera) 16 . Hallucinations set aside, a landscape, even understood as a perspectival observer-dependent relational entity, also always involves the existence of something, say, the existence of the Matterhorn.
In a sense, landscapes share with photographs the transparency feature, as Walton (1984) calls it in the case of photographs. Walton claims that photographs allow us to literally see the objects they depict -they are, then, transparent. I am not going to defend Walton's view about photographs here (I do so in Benovsky (2011, §5) where I defend the transparency thesis, albeit for reasons that differ from Walton's own), I am simply going to take it on board, as controversial as it is. The idea is then this: when we see a photograph of the Matterhorn, given the transparency thesis, we see the Matterhorn itself. When we look at the Matterhorn and we appreciate the resulting landscape, we see the Matterhorn itself as well -framed and all, as we have already seen. This is how an appreciation of the landscape and of the photograph are so close to each other, when it comes to the transparency thesis. (Of course, it is crucial to keep in mind here that the landscape is not just the mountain. The mountain is out there in the world, it is a piece of nature. The landscape is a perspectival observer-dependent entity.)
Finally, an important feature of photographs to be insisted upon is that, like in the case of paintings or other works of art, the spectator of a photograph is guided par the artist. The artist's intentions, when the work is successful and correctly appreciated, guide the imagination 17 and the overall appreciation of the spectator of the work. In the case of 16 photographs, this guidance is a particularly salient and important point, which I discuss in detail in Benovsky (2012a, §2-3) ; let me shortly sum it up here. The point is about attention management. For instance, the photographer can purposefully guide and control the attention of the spectator by deciding where she will look first and where she will look next, thus deciding the order in which she sees things, using tools such as the choice of depth of field, the choice of exposure of the main subject comparatively to its surroundings, the composition of the photograph, or the relative size of the main subject to its surroundings. The photographer makes here some intentional choices, creating a photograph that will make some of the depicted elements more perceptually salient than others. When doing this, the photographer exploits the natural tendency of our perceptual system to, for instance, first look at what is sharp and only then at what is blurred (probably because what is sharp provides more information). Exploiting this natural perceptual tendency, when the photographer makes a choice of, say, a shallow depth of field, she then effectively guides the spectator's attention, literally forcing her to look at a specific part of the photograph rather than another -the natural tendency of a perceptual system of any normal observer will make her look first at what is sharp and only then at what is blurred.
Of course, when it comes to landscapes, there is no such thing as a choice of depth of field (although when one focuses on a specific part of a landscape, the remaining parts of the landscape are perceived in a less sharp way, since our field of vision is not uniformly sharp, so perhaps this could be understood in a parallel way). But clearly, the choice of a point of view, the choice of the time of observation, and the framing, are ways to guide one's appreciation of a landscape, exactly as in the case of photographs. The photographer chooses such-and-such a framing because she wants her spectator to look at such-and-such a thing and focus on it. The same is true about landscapes. The observer chooses a point of view, a time, and a framing, which are the best suited for appreciating a landscape (turning in the opposite direction, say, would have the opposite effect). Now, of course, the one who makes these choices and the one who benefits from them is, in the case of landscapes, always and necessarily the same person (telepathy set aside) -unlike in the case of photographs where the observer can be a different person than the author. The idea I want to put forward here is then that appreciation of landscapes and appreciation of photographs do work in interestingly similar ways, with the relevant observation that in the case of landscapes the 'artist' and the spectator are one and the same person 18 . §6. Positive aesthetics for landscapes?
In the preceding sections, I offered an account of aesthetic appreciation of landscapes based on the idea that landscapes are perspectival observer-dependent entities, and that their appreciation often importantly involves imagination and belief/knowledge. I have also argued that there are some interesting similarities between landscapes and photographs, with the difference that in the case of landscapes the artist and the spectator are necessarily one and the same person. But, the two roles -the artist's and the spectator's -can be conceptually distinguished, even if the person playing the two roles is necessarily the same. This latter claim, taken together with the other points of the overall view I am offering, has an interesting consequence when it comes to the "positive aesthetic" thesis (see, for instance, Carlson (1984) ). This thesis is usually a claim about aesthetic appreciation of nature, and not of landscapes in my sense, but it could very well be adapted to the case of landscapes as well. To put it briefly, the idea is that nature (or landscapes) always has positive aesthetic properties and never negative ones -in short, nature is always beautiful, never ugly. One can easily find the Matterhorn or the Cliffs of Moher to be beautiful, but there is beauty to be found in every piece of nature: a small pebble on the beach can have a beautiful shape, and even a wasteland can be beautiful (perhaps when one gets to understand that it involves an interestingly balanced ecosystem) -there is always some beauty to be found, if one looks carefully.
This thesis is very plausible and it certainly fits our everyday aesthetic experiences of nature. When it comes to photographs or other types of works of art, like paintings, the claim is that these can have negative as well as positive aesthetic properties, since -unlike naturethey are created in an intentional way by an artist, and that the artist might fail in her deed: her intentions might be uninteresting or boring, or they can be badly executed, and the resulting artwork might thus be judged to be unpleasant or otherwise aesthetically negatively evaluated.
In the case of nature, this cannot happen simply because there were no intentions in the first place, so there can be no uninteresting or boring intentions, and no failure in their execution. Now, quite obviously, given the understanding of the nature and the appreciation of landscapes from the preceding sections, where a landscape, unlike nature 19 , comes into being via an interaction with an observer -the 'artist' -when she chooses, at the very least, a point of view, a framing, and a time of observation, there is then room for bad choices and failure.
As we have seen, aesthetic properties of landscapes (as of all objects of aesthetic appreciation)
are grounded in their non-aesthetic properties. These include the context of creation, that is, a point of view, a framing, and a time of observation -thus, they include such-and-such sensory properties rather than others -and they also include non-sensory properties based in the taste of the evaluator, the information she has, and the way she uses her imagination; all of which can be triggered and guided by the 'creator' of the landscape (by the kind of choices 
